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Abstract 
Valence asymmetry is the defined as the tendency for people to differentiate more among 
their negative emotions than their positive emotions (Rice & Lindquist, in preparation). 
However, the mechanism behind this valence asymmetry has yet to be identified. 
According to the constructionist view of emotions and the Conceptual Act Theory 
(CAT), emotions are made meaningful when we combine an affective experience with 
our conceptual knowledge (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, 2013). Therefore, the present study 
tested three different hypotheses: participants would exhibit valence asymmetry in 
emotional differentiation, participants would possess greater conceptual complexity for 
negative emotions than for positive emotions, and that greater conceptual knowledge of 
emotions would be positively correlated with emotional differentiation. Participants 
completed both a card-sort task to measure conceptual complexity (Showers, 1992; 
Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999; Linville, 1985) and a lab-based measure to assess 
emotional differentiation (Lang et al., 2005). The valence asymmetry was replicated and 
participants demonstrated greater conceptual complexity for negative emotions than for 
positive emotions; however, conceptual complexity was not significantly correlated with 
emotion differentiation. 
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Imagine a time that you felt really great. Perhaps you were unable to pinpoint this 
emotional experience as awe, amusement, or gratitude, and, instead, experienced this 
positive state as simply happy. Now, think back to a time when you felt really bad. You 
most likely were able to identify a specific emotional experience associated this negative 
state such as fear, anger, or disgust. This phenomenon in which people tend to describe 
their negative and positive emotional states with varying degrees of precision reflects 
differences in emotional granularity, or the specificity with which people experience 
different emotional states (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). Previous 
studies have determined that in general, people demonstrate greater granularity (i.e., more 
precision) for negative emotions than positive ones (Rice & Lindquist, in preparation). In 
this research study, I seek to evaluate one mechanism that may underlie this valence 
asymmetry in emotional granularity.  
Emotional granularity: Individual differences in emotional differentiation 
Granularity is defined as the ability to distinguish between basic “good versus 
bad” feelings and further classify them as discrete emotions (Barrett et al., 2001). The 
difference in how positive and negative emotions are described and categorized (and 
potentially experienced) as discrete by those experiencing them is significant for several 
reasons. Emotion regulation is an important and beneficial byproduct of granularity for 
negative emotions. As people differentiate among their emotions with precision, they 
activate emotional knowledge. The activation of emotional knowledge in turn facilitates 
access to behavioral repertoires that allows for greater regulation of emotions (Barrett et 
al., 2001).  By contrast, people who are depressed tend to differentiate less among 
negative emotions than healthy individuals. This inability to differentiate among negative 
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emotions causes problems with identifying the source of negative affect. Therefore, it 
may be difficult to formulate an adaptive response to unpleasant experiences in 
depression (Demiralp et al., 2012). 
Although a reasonably sized body of research has considered differentiation 
among negative emotions, far fewer studies have focused on positive emotions. Tugade et 
al. (2004) found that individuals who differentiated more amongst positive emotions 
engaged in less self-distracting as a means of coping. Positive emotions were also 
correlated with behavioral disengagement, which involves taking a moment before taking 
action in order to cope. Additionally, people with higher positive emotional granularity 
are more likely to consider various ways to behaviorally cope with the situation at hand 
(Tugade et al., 2004).  
There is good reason to suspect that distinguishing between different positive 
emotions would provide a host of other beneficial outcomes. Growing evidence shows 
that positive emotions in general mediate the relationship between coping and health such 
that people reporting more positive emotions tend to cope faster, have lower instances of 
re-admittance into the hospital after being releases, exhibit improved immune system 
functioning with fewer visits to the doctor concerning illness, and typically tend to live 
longer in general (Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004). In a recent study, when 
participants were asked to meditate on and self-generate positive feelings directed at the 
self and at others, their cardiac vagal tone—one indicator of physical and social health—
improved (Kok et al., 2013). Furthermore, participants’ perceptions of social connections 
led to this relationship between positive emotion and physical health. This association 
means that as positive emotions and social connections continue to grow, physical health 
         CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITY           Mason 5 	  
(as it is related to the function of the vagus nerve) is enhanced. Regulation via the vagus 
nerve was also correlated with cardiovascular health suggesting that overtime as positive 
emotional and social experiences increase so too does physical health. 
Furthermore, other evidence suggests that discrete positive emotions—beyond 
just general positive feelings—have benefits. For example, gratitude has been found to 
strengthen relationships when one member of a relationship provides a benefit and the 
other member of the dyad is responsive to that provision (Algoe, 2012). Further, 
relationships are seen as more communal when gratitude is expressed and this expression 
of gratitude is likely to lead to reciprocated prosocial behavior toward the person who 
expressed gratitude (Algoe, 2012). Pride is associated with likeability among interactions 
and causes individuals to take on leadership roles in a group setting and to build social 
capital (Williams & DeSteno, 2009). Taking on leadership roles is seen in problem-
solving tasks in which participants who were induced to experience pride spend more 
time trying to solve a puzzle and are regarded as dominant by other group members. 
Awe, by contrast, causes individuals to feel unity with friends and others in general in 
religious samples (Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012).   
Despite the potential benefits of experiencing positive emotions discretely, studies 
assessing granularity tend to sum across negative and positive emotions. Those that 
looked at positive and negative granularity separately tend to find an intriguing difference 
in participants’ degree of granularity for negative and positive emotions, with participants 
tending to be more granular for negative than positive emotions over all (Rice & 
Lindquist, in preparation). The reason for this “valence asymmetry in emotional 
granularity” remains a mystery. One explanation for why people tend to describe 
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negative emotions in greater detail than positive emotions could be that people lack a 
comparable degree of conceptual knowledge for positive emotions.  
Conceptual knowledge contributes to discrete emotional experiences 
Conceptual knowledge is relevant in the study of emotions because it is thought 
that emotions, rather than being basic modules that trigger certain experiences, are 
actually the result of  “situated conceptualizations.” This theory is termed the Conceptual 
Act Theory (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, 2013). According to the CAT, emotions are 
comprised of both affective and conceptual components. More specifically, emotions 
occur when basic feelings of positivity or negativity are made meaningful using 
knowledge about emotions derived from prior experiences or learned via others. It 
follows that one source of granularity—complexity in emotional experiences—might 
result because certain individuals possess complex knowledge about different emotion 
categories (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). According to the CAT, conceptual knowledge is 
acquired in part via prior experiences and in part via the emotion concepts specific to a 
certain culture and language (Lindquist, 2013). I predict that a valence asymmetry in 
emotional granularity might stem from participants’ greater complexity of conceptual 
knowledge for negative versus positive emotion categories. 
 This CAT is used in the present study in an effort to discern why people are more 
likely to distinguish between negative emotions as opposed to positive emotions. I am 
seeking to determine why this valence asymmetry is present because it can lead to 
understanding of how people experience emotions as more nuanced states as opposed to 
generally good or bad. For example, in a specific context imagine that your heart begins 
to beat rapidly, your hands suddenly become sweaty, and you experience an increase in 
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your respiration. The CAT predicts that as you experience these affective changes, you 
begin to make meaning of them, categorizing them as fear, anger, or anxiety depending 
on the context. Therefore, it follows that a person who possesses a nuanced knowledge of 
emotion—differentiating between nervousness, fear, anger, joy, contentment, awe, etc.—
would experience emotions as more refined in daily life as compared with someone who 
simply experiences good and bad feelings.  
The present study 
To test the hypothesis that greater emotional granularity stems from greater 
complexity of conceptual knowledge for emotion categories, I assessed conceptual 
knowledge of emotions through a card-sort task, which has been used in previous studies 
to explore complexity of other abstract categories such as the self (Showers, 1992; 
Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999; Linville, 1985). In these studies, participants are 
given a stack of cards displaying various adjectives and then asked to sort the cards into 
meaningful self-relevant groups. The number of non-overlapping groups created by the 
participant demonstrates complexity. For example, participants who sorted cards into 
more groups that were non-overlapping demonstrated greater self-complexity and higher 
self-esteem (Showers, 1992). Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle (1999) looked at self-
complexity as a combination of the number of piles produced and the amount of overlap 
between piles and found that overlap suggests strengthened self-complexity.  
In the present study, I designed a card sort task to specifically assess the 
complexity of individuals’ positive and negative emotion concepts. Participants were 
presented with a series of cards containing attributes relevant to emotions, including 
appraisal dimensions, action tendencies, facial expressions, and bodily sensations.  
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Measuring conceptual complexity 
Appraisals. Appraisal dimensions have been tied to conceptual knowledge of 
emotions. Appraisals describe the cognitive components underlying what it is like to 
experience a certain emotion—for instance, in fear, people experience the world as full of 
risk (cf. Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). Other emotions such as joy and happiness are 
characterized by intrinsic pleasantness, certainty of goal outcomes, and control. Another 
hypothesized appraisal is that sadness would be associated with low control and power 
and obstacles to goal outcomes (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). I thus included words 
related to appraisals such as “feeling threat,” “feeling in control” “feeling pleased,” etc.  
Action tendencies. Many models of emotion suggest that certain emotions are 
associated with certain actions. Although the CAT does not predict that certain emotions 
automatically elicit certain behaviors, it predicts that knowledge about emotion in part 
involves knowledge about the behaviors that are associated with certain emotions in 
certain contexts (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008). For example, Frija and Parrott (2011) 
discuss how the action tendency of submission can be a part of various emotions, 
including, shame, respect, humility, etc. I therefore included words related to action 
tendencies such as “punch,” “run,” “freeze,” “approach,” “avoid” etc. to examine the 
complexity of participants’ emotional conceptual knowledge.  
Facial expressions. Facial expressions are also associated with different emotions. 
There are culturally-relative “prototypes” for what facial expressions look like, even if 
there is great variability in the faces individuals produce across contexts and experiences 
(Russell 1994; Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012). Nonetheless, representations 
of prototypical facial expressions might help comprise knowledge about an emotion 
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category (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008). Thus, I also included cards listing words related to 
facial expressions such as “smile,” “frown,” “scowl,” etc. Additionally, concepts are 
identified as the knowledge needed to recognize an emotion embedded in a facial 
expression (Adolphs, 2002; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). Therefore, we can recognize a 
facial expression as conveying a certain emotion given our conceptual knowledge of that 
emotion (Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). In the card-sorting task, facial expressions 
provided me with an idea of the participants’ conceptual knowledge of emotions.  
Bodily sensations. Bodily sensations are another significant factor that contributes 
to the experience of emotion. Emotions are colloquially about feelings. Indeed, studies 
have shown that emotions are “embodied” phenomena—even thinking about emotions 
involves activation of the sensorimotor brain regions involved in experiencing those 
emotions (Niedenthal, 2007). Therefore, I included cards listing bodily sensations that 
might be associated with different emotion categories such as “warm,” “cold,” “shivers” 
etc.   
Measuring granularity  
In addition to testing participants’ complexity of conceptual knowledge, I also 
assessed whether emotion knowledge complexity was related to granularity or not. To do 
so, I used a lab-based measure to assess participants’ degree of granularity for positive 
and negative emotions. This lab-based measure was a computerized task in which 
participants viewed an evocative image from the International Picture System (IAPS) 
(Lang et al., 2005) for 6 seconds and then were asked to rate the extent to which they felt 
sixteen different emotions on a 1-7 Likert scale. Granularity was measured as the degree 
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to which participants distinguished between same-valenced emotions using Intra-class 
Correlations.  
Predictions 
I predicted that participants who have highly complex knowledge about emotion 
categories would create more groups, as in the self-complexity literature. Yet I also 
reasoned that participants who are highly complex would create more overlapping 
groups, unlike the self-complexity literature because participants with complex 
conceptual knowledge would recognize the variability that exists in emotions (Barrett, 
2006) and would thus see their attributes as more overlapping.  
Methods 
 
Participants 
The study included 61 participants  (44 female, 17 male) all of whom were 
undergraduate students enrolled in PSYC 101 at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. The average age among participants was 19. Participants received 1 research 
credit in exchange for their participation. Participants were excluded from this study if 
they had participated in another study titled Ratings of Positive and Negative Emotions 
because it was a similar study being run in the same lab.  
Measures/Materials 
Design. The present study is correlational because neither granularity nor 
complexity were manipulated. However, individual differences in complexity serve as the 
predictor variable while granularity is the outcome variable. A within-subjects design was 
used in this research study because I sought to compare complexity of conceptual 
knowledge and granularity levels for positive and negative emotions within a person. 
         CONCEPTUAL COMPLEXITY           Mason 11 	  
Each participant was exposed to each condition, the card-sort task and the E-prime task. 
The order in which the tasks were completed was counterbalanced to avoid order effects.  
Card sort task. In order to measure complexity of conceptual knowledge, a card 
sort task was given to the participants. Complexity was measured based on how many 
groups and overlapping groups that participants created.   
To complete this task, before the participant entered the study room a stack of 
fifty 2½ x 2 inch white cards with black lettering was placed on the table, which also 
contained a computer and lap-desk. There was also a stack of 16 standard flash cards that 
were blank placed beside the cards with lettering. Upon entering the study room, 
participants were told that each 2½ x 2 card displayed an emotional attribute, or 
characteristic. Then, they were asked to sort emotional attributes into as many categories 
as they would like and then to give each category an emotional word name (i.e., akin to 
sorting claws, fur, and four legs into a one category and labeling it tiger) and to place the 
piles onto a black lap desk so that the experimenter could collect the piles once they were 
finished. They were also handed the card-sort instructions and asked to let the 
experimenter know when they had completed this part of the study.  
Granularity task. For the lab-based measure, participants were directed into the 
study room where they were asked to sit at a table with a computer, keyboard, and mouse 
on it. The screen was already turned on before the participant entered the room. It 
displayed a white background with black lettering, which provided the directions for the 
task. In addition to the directions being displayed on the screen, the experimenter briefly 
explained the directions saying, “In this task, you will see multiple images for a couple 
seconds and then you will be asked to rate several different emotions. You will enter in 
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that rating using the keyboard. Please go with your first gut feeling upon seeing the 
emotion word on the screen. The directions for the task are on the screen. Please let me 
know if you have any questions.”  
E-prime software was used to construct a task in which participants viewed 
different images, half positive and half negative with 48 images in total. After each 
individual photo was shown, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt 
16 different emotions on a likert scale with 1 being not at all, 4 being somewhat, and 7 
being very strongly.  
Individual difference measures. Once both the card-sort task and the E-prime task 
were completed, the experimenter opened a Qualtrics questionnaire, which contained the 
RDEES and Toronto Alexithymia Scale, which were used to indicate participants’ ability 
to identify emotions. These measures will not be discussed further. A demographic 
survey was included at the end of the survey in order to gather information on the gender, 
ethnicity, and age of participants. 
Procedure 
Before arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, 
either receiving the E-prime task first or the card-sort task first. This counterbalancing 
was done in an effort to minimize order effects. Upon arrival, participants were greeted, 
directed to a room where they were seated at a desk with the E-prime task opened on the 
computer screen and cards for the card-sort task placed on the desk, and then given an 
explanation that the study would occupy approximately an hour of their time and would 
require the use of the computer and the paper cards that composed the card-sort task. 
They were then asked to sign a consent form before proceeding.  
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Once participants read over and signed the consent form, the directions for the 
first task were explained to them. These directions corresponded with the task they were 
to complete first based on which counterbalanced condition they were assigned to. The 
directions for the card-sort task were as follows:  
These cards represent attributes of different types of emotions. Your task is to sort 
cards into as many emotion categories as you can think of. When you’re done 
sorting, we’ll ask you to label each category with an emotion word. For instance, 
imagine, you are being asked to sort attributes into animal categories, you might 
put “fur,” “stripes,” and “claws” into a category and label “tiger.” Here, we would 
like for you to do something similar with these attributes for emotions. You can 
use each attribute as many times as necessary when you sort. We are giving you 
extra note cards and a pen so you can duplicate any given attribute as you see fit. 
For instance, in the example with animals, if you wanted to use the attribute 
“claws” in several different animal categories, you could just create several new 
cards with the words “claws” on them and place them in the categories you think 
they would best belong in.  When doing the emotion sort, please duplicate the 
card exactly—please don’t create new attributes on these cards. If you have any 
questions, please ask me now. 
 
Before engaging in the E-prime task, participants saw the following directions on the 
computer screen: 
In this research study, you will be viewing different images and then rating the 
extent to which you felt certain emotions while viewing the images. Please enter 
in a value using the keyboard. You may press the spacebar to begin when you are 
ready.  
 
Results 
Data Processing. 
The E-prime task measured granularity, which was assessed as average intraclass 
correlations with absolute agreement between same-valence emotion adjectives. If 
participants produced a high ICC for positive (or negative) emotions, this meant that they 
rated many of the positive (or negative) attributes at the same level across instances. For 
example, when shown several pictures, across these photos, the participant would have 
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rated feelings of happiness, joy, contentment, etc. at the same level (i.e., by rating each 
emotion as a 3). However, if in one picture, the participant reported that they felt a 7 on 
anger, a 1 on disgust, a 2 on fear, and a 1 on sadness compared with another instance in 
which they rated disgust as a 7, anger as a 1, fear as a 1, and sadness as a 1, they would 
have had a low ICC for negative emotions.  
Two raters scored the card sort piles as positive or negative based on label given 
to the individual piles by the participant. If the valence of the pile was still unclear after 
looking at the label of the pile, the raters examined what emotional attributes were placed 
in the pile and coded the pile accordingly. As a result, inter-rater agreement was perfect 
for all piles. For each participant, the number of positively valenced and negatively 
valenced piles was tallied.  
Primary Analysis.  
A paired-samples t-test revealed a significant difference in participants’ positive 
and negative ICCs, replicating the valence asymmetry that was found in previous studies, 
was replicated in the present study (Rice & Lindquist, in preparation). The average ICC 
for differentiation between positive emotions (M = 0.80, SD = 0.13) was higher than 
participants’ differentiation between negative emotions (M =.69, SD =.14), t(60)=4.79, p 
< .01. 
Furthermore, I analyzed the degree of conceptual complexity by comparing the 
mean number of piles participants produced on the card sort task for both positive and 
negative emotions using a paired samples t-test. Consistent with my hypothesis, the t-test 
demonstrated that participants made more negatively valenced piles (M = 4.93, SD = 
1.40) than positively valenced piles (M = 3.61, SD = 1.43) from the 50 emotion attributes, 
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t(60)=7.41, p<.01. This finding suggests that participants possessed more complex 
conceptual knowledge about negative emotions than about positive emotions. Too few 
participants created overlap in the attributes, so I was unable to assess whether variation 
in overlap differed between positive and negative emotions, or whether it was related to 
emotion differentiation. 
I next determined whether participants’ degree of emotion differentiation for 
positive versus negative emotion was related to conceptual complexity by analyzing the 
correlation between same-valenced ICC scores and pile numbers using a bivariate 
correlational analysis. Contrary to my predictions greater conceptual complexity for 
negative emotions was not significantly correlated with a greater differentiation for 
negative emotions, r = -0.2, p = 0.12. Additionally, conceptual complexity of positive 
emotions was not correlated with positive emotion differentiation, r = -0.07, p < 0.61. 
Accordingly, our measures of conceptual complexity and differentiation do not appear to 
be related to one another, at least not as explored here.  
Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore why people tend to exhibit a 
valence asymmetry in their emotional differentiation. The proposed answer to this 
question was that greater complexity in conceptual knowledge for negative emotions 
rather than positive emotions would lend itself to greater differentiation between negative 
rather than positive emotions. Consistent with our first hypothesis, a valence asymmetry 
between positive and negative emotions was replicated in this study (Rice & Lindquist, in 
preparation). Furthermore, the results of the paired-samples t-test suggested that 
participants did in fact, on average, possess more complex conceptual knowledge for 
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negative emotions as opposed to positive emotions. However, failure to find a significant 
correlation between conceptual complexity and differentiation did not support that 
hypothesis that conceptual complexity is associated with the asymmetry in emotional 
differentiation. To more clearly test this hypothesis, future research must also directly 
manipulate conceptual complexity and test its impact on differentiation. One means of 
doing this might be to train individuals to have more complex concept knowledge for 
positive and negative emotions and see if it alters their degree of differentiation.  
Training in order to increase complex conceptual knowledge could prove helpful 
in light of the failure to find any meaningful variation in overlap between categories. 
Lack of overlap was due to very few participants choosing to replicate any of the cards.  
While the valence asymmetry was replicated and increased conceptual complexity 
for negative emotions compared with positive emotions was observed, these two items 
did not map onto each other to produce a significant correlation between the two 
variables. However, the correlation between negative differentiation and negative 
conceptual knowledge was approaching significance (p = 0.12), suggesting that with 
more power, this relationship might be observed in future studies. By contrast, the 
relationship between positive emotion concepts and positive emotion differentiation is 
not likely to become significant with more power. These findings suggest that if 
conceptual complexity is related to any type of emotion differentiation, it is negative 
differentiation, and not positive. This finding would be consistent with the idea that 
differences in emotion differentiation reflect not just the existence of complex conceptual 
knowledge for emotion, but also the online use of such knowledge (Lindquist & Barrett, 
2008). That is, individuals might use their complex conceptual knowledge about negative 
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emotion categories to help construct discrete instances of anger, disgust, fear, etc., but are 
not able or not motivated to use conceptual knowledge about positive emotion categories 
to help construct discrete instances of pride, gratitude, awe, etc. Future studies should 
investigate this hypothesis.  
Limitations 
One of the limitations of the present study includes a possible restriction of range 
for the number of positive piles created by the participants or the degree of positive 
differentiation, such that each individual participant created very few positive piles. 
Restriction of range thus limits the variation in a sample and ability to find a significant 
correlation.  
Additionally, there may have been drawbacks in the methods that inhibited our 
ability to observe a correlation between conceptual complexity and differentiation. There 
was a lack of a situational context component in the card-sort attribute set, which might 
have limited our ability to observe truly complex emotion categories. Emotions are not 
stable across situations and circumstances. Certain emotions occur in particular situations 
and others do not (Mesquita & Boiger, 2012). Consequently, in the future, situations 
should be included, such as “at work,” “at home,” “in a store,” “playing sports,” etc., 
which might allow participants more opportunities to demonstrate complex conceptual 
knowledge. 
While small sample size was not necessarily an issue because of the within 
subjects design of my study, women were over-represented in my sample. This may have 
skewed the results. Although previous studies have not observed gender differences in 
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differentiation, women may have more complex conceptual knowledge of emotion (see 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2008).  
Considering only a few participants opted to replicate emotional attributes, the 
card sort task instructions could be written a way that requires participants to use as many 
cards repeatedly as possible. Other analysis methods might also be used. For instance, 
multidimensional scaling is an analysis technique that could be used in future studies in 
order to assess the dimensions that participants are using to guide their sorts. Even though 
this study did not produce significant results, reasoning and previous research would 
suggest that there should in fact be a relationship between conceptual complexity and 
emotional differentiation. Therefore, I do not believe that nonsignificant results can be 
taken to mean that there is no relationship between conceptual complexity and emotional 
granularity to be found all; it simply means that we must keep looking. 
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